Competence Poverty of #KMG – Machinations Exposed! Part-II
#Tenderman seemed intent on achieving through guile what he could not have done during service. He created an unprecedented level of confusion and chaos throughout the Indian Railways, resulting in the destruction of hundreds of senior officers’ careers and thousands of potential UPSC entrants
The delay of the Vande Bharat project was actually due to Office Order 58 of 2016, which was drafted and enacted by the #Advisor
It was the hidden agenda of the #Advisor to appear irreplaceable in the Board’s office that led to avoidable loss of 3 years in the Vande Bharat project
Abstract:
This article discusses the Competence Poverty of #KMG and the machinations exposed through the recent 9000 hp project bidding process. It looks at how #KMG is created by small set of Railway Board officers who emphasise need to be “vendor friendly” rather than “industry friendly” or subject matter experts. The piece looks at how the decisions made by #Tenderman, aka #Advisor were irresponsible, resulting in multi-billion dollar losses to Indian Railways and leaving many railwaymen in a lurch. It further looks at the 8 axles vs. 12 axles issue and the need for Indian Railways to review the desirability for very long-term contracts in the backdrop of evolving technology. It also calls for broad consultation with experts, industry players and other stakeholders before any tendering process is initiated, ensuring that any decisions made are in the best interest of both the Indian Railways and Indian taxpayers.
We recently published an article discussing the implications of the Siemens bid in the 9000 hp project.
Please Read once again: “Competence Poverty of #KMG – Machinations Exposed!“
We opened the piece by highlighting the “Competence Poverty of #KMG – Machinations Exposed!”, and discussing the ‘mind boggling implications’. Since then, we have been receiving various inquiries regarding these implications. Let us explore these in further detail..
It has become a norm that in order to succeed at the Railway Board or RDSO, one needs to be “vendor friendly” rather than “industry friendly” or domain expert. Further, spate of cancellation of transfer orders after change of guard at the top shows #AIDS personnel are real mahabalis. Alarmingly, Railway Board has not taken into consideration any input from recently superannuated senior officers in regards to their decisions before reverting or tinkering with orders signed by them.
In “KMG_2.0: रोटेशन के बजाय रेलवे में दिया जा रहा भ्रष्टाचार और जोड़-तोड़ को संरक्षण”, we explained how ‘mahabalis’ got their orders outside Delhi changed and moved from Baroda House to Rail Bhawan and in another case from Rail Bhawan to DFCCIL to Baroda House in just few months – all in a radius of 10 km and cocking a snook at earlier Chairman’s orders to transfer them.
These acts just embolden #AIDS and signal to all railway officers and employees that who the real powerful people are as they could thumb their nose at Chairman, Railway Board!
The recent scenario of bribery, manipulation, and exploitation in the Railways is highly concerning and needs to be addressed immediately – “CBI arrests DyCE & SSE of NFR including a contractor, and recovers Rs. 1.02 crore in bribery of Rs. 8 lakh“. It is time to enforce the necessary regulations and protocols to ensure that the Indian rolling stock market is not exposed to any further misconduct and loss to exchequer due to poor domain expertise.
But how long can the system be gamed?
But how long can this system of gaming be sustained? When #Tenderman, aka #Advisor, reappeared after superannuation, gloves were off. With the publication of his controversial and well planned autobiography, “Never a Bystander”, which was analysed by #Railwhispers heavily using crowdsourced inputs, #Tenderman seemed intent on achieving through guile what he could not have done during service. He created an unprecedented level of confusion and chaos throughout the Indian Railways, resulting in the destruction of hundreds of senior officers’ careers and thousands of potential #UPSC entrants.
The #KMG series of articles did much to expose the shady dealings of #Tenderman and his henchmen, and a renewed sense of hope soon spread amongst railwaymen. Now, #Tenderman is again being held accountable for his incompetence and the billions of dollars of losses the Indian Railways continues to suffer.
The 9,000 hp tender was seen as something positive, however, in light of the Prime Minister’s vision to maximize market strength and ensure fairness. Yet, the difference between the lowest and second lowest bidder demonstrated that technical issues are not the strength of the #Advisor, raising questions about the validity of awards of those contracts where he has played key role.
#Tenderman – you are now being called out again – this time, for your incompetence and putting multi-billion dollar bleed on Indian Raikway’s finances.
L-1 Price for 9000 hp platform
Moving to the issue of prices, many railwaymen argued that the 9000 hp tenders are workable and in line with price discovered by CLW in their 9000 hp project. #Siemens bid was the L-1 and the sheer margin by it was lower than L-2 upset #KMG’s core. This put in question acquisition cost of Madhepura locomotives.
In response, then CRB Mr Vinay Kumar Tripathi put a hold on the 12000 hp project that was due to be inaugurated by the #PrimeMinister. This was due to the need for the review of the specifications of the 12000 hp loco and concern that Madhepura locomotive specifications cannot be the benchmark specifications. Additionally, the Madhepura locomotive was proving to be an expensive acquisition.
At present, the Madhepura locomotive costs Rs.32 crore, up from Rs.28 crore due to price variation clauses (#PVCs) in the contract, whereas #CLW, #BLW and #PLW have been able to decrease the prices of their locomotives every year.
Railwaymen have also been debating the desirability of a 12 axle vis a vis 8 axle locomotive. While ‘experts’ of the Railway Board cite Chinese experience, they seem to have forgotten the Indian experience. In the 1970s, Indian Railways married a diesel locomotive bogie bought from the USA with AC locomotive electrics derived from European and Japanese technology, paving the way for the successful WAP4, WAG7 locomotives, which are 6 axle locomotives. WAP5 is the only 4 axle locomotive due to the projected need of a 180 kmph passenger operation. The Chinese went by the experience of their European principals and stuck with 4 axle locomotives.
The Technology Tradeoff of 8 Axle Permanently Coupled Locomotives – Confusion in #KMG
Confusion was seeded ever since European consultants persuaded Rail Bhawan to opt for 8 axle permanently coupled locomotives back in 2007-08. China had already adopted the same configuration, providing an additional argument to make the switch. Supporters argued that such locomotives would be track-friendly, but at the top speed of 100 kmph this argument has been highly debatable.
When the tender was finally awarded in 2015-16, many were left wondering why locomotives manufactured by Indian companies such as CLW, BLW, PLW, and BHEL could not be coupled to generate a higher horsepower of 12000 hp at a much cheaper cost per unit. Against all odds, #Tenderman went ahead with it, signing a long-term contract to buy 800-1000 locomotives of 12000 hp from the Madhepura locomotive factory.
The PR exercise of #Advisor taking the Minister to the Madhepura locomotive factory in December 2021 has come under scrutiny following the bid of Siemens, which has now made the Madhepura locomotive a white elephant-
Advanced technology and better materials have now improved the design of higher horsepower locomotives, making permanent coupling less desirable than the 10000-12000 hp modular locomotives. Modular locomotives offer greater reliability, scalability, and cost benefits.
Deciphering the Issue of 8 vs 12 axles
Railway locomotives are an integral part of today’s transport and freight operations. One key factor in the design of these locomotives is the number of axles it has that are powered and the weight of the superstructure it carries. The percentage of weight that is translated into pull at the coupler is known as adhesion. This is independent of the propulsion type and is an important concept in locomotion.
To achieve higher pull at the coupler, more powered axles are hence needed. For instance, a 12000 hp Madhepura locomotive gives about 710 kilo Newtons of pull at a cost of Rs. 32 crores, whereas coupling two 6000 hp WAG9 locomotives gives 1020 kilo Newtons of pull at a cost of Rs. 21 crores with 12000 hp motive power.
The table above shows the train starting capability for three different locomotive combinations. It can be seen that even coupling two WAG7 locomotives gives better results than a WAG12 locomotive, especially on 1 in 100 rising grades which are not uncommon. Critics may talk of regeneration, but the capex needed for WAG12 is about 10 crores per 12000 hp unit as opposed to two coupled WAG9 which give the same horse power and much higher starting tractive effort with regeneration capability. This higher starting tractive effort remains constant until the locomotive reaches 12000 hp, also increases acceleration. Thus between three locomotive combinations, WAG12 scores lowest on initial acceleration, esp. around practical speeds-which is very critical to sectional capacity improvement.
The rush to tender for the 12000 hp locomotives without considering the tractive effort delivery is questionable. Freight targets need high tractive effort and high horsepower locomotives, yet there has been a compromising of tractive effort. This has resulted in the pouring of Marowrah factory outputs into a large fleet of idling diesels and the manufacturing of the WAG12 locomotive at a cost of 10 crores more than what Indian Railway’s own factories manufacture. The WAG12 locomotive also scores less on tractive effort delivery by a whopping 30%.
Vande Bharat to 12000 hp locomotive – The Myth Making by #KMG
It is said that Minister for Railways believes that without the #Advisor, the Vande Bharat project would not be possible. However, this belief is wrong.
The delay of the Vande Bharat project was actually due to Office Order 58 of 2016, which was drafted and enacted by the #Advisor. This order was soon followed by the suspicious creation of the Trainset Directorate and the shunting of the PS&EMU Directorate of the RDSO. This led to doubts about the undue haste according to the approval of the prototype Train-18. Though fears about the quality of trains were unfounded but the unseemly haste did damage, as officers were unwilling to risk signing approvals.
Interestingly, #Advisor helped create a case for setting up the Trainset Directorate at RDSO when Mr Ashwini Lohani a Jamalpur graduate was CRB, he helped the next CRB, an electrical officer to shut it down.
The resulting logjam caused the project to return to the hands of the Directorates that traditionally handled the matter, ultimately leading to its success. It was sad that the real issue of the merger of Carriage with PS&EMU was not thought of, instead a new directorate was created in less than 24 hours. It was the hidden agenda of the #Advisor to appear irreplaceable in the Board’s office that led to avoidable loss of 3 years in the Vande Bharat project.
All senior officers we spoke to agree that once the system was in agreement, producing more Vande Bharat trains was not a challenge. The success of the first two rakes has helped freeze the designs.
#RCF, #ICF, and #MCF have given record output of #LHB coaches in the past few years. Why should manufacturing of Vande Bharats be any different once designs are frozen? ICF also handled MRVC project rolling stock.
The real challenge of producing the 12000 hp platform was due to the flaws in the specifications. The #Tenderman was the one responsible for this, as he intimidated the Rolling Stock Directorates and all the senior officers who could have questioned his motives. Indian Railways would be forever grateful to Mr Vinay Tripathi for saving tens of thousands of crores by putting the specifications up for review.
Some Lessons of 9000 hp project
• Desirability of very long term contracts needs urgent review. It needs to be analysed where contract went wrong that Madhepura locomotives are getting more expensive on PVC account where as Indian Railway’s own production units have claimed lowering of prices.
• Desirability of very long term contracts in view of evolving technology. Barely one year after Minister for Railways claimed – 21 December 2021 that WAG12 is world’s best technology at lowest price, it now turns out to be a white elephant delivering 30% less on most critical of locomotive parameters-its maximum tractive effort. MR to at least now understand that he has been gamed.
• Cost per horsepower to be deliberated, otherwise Madhepura factory would be as painful as the other Marowrah factory on Indian Railways finances.
• Need to club tenders of Indian Railway’s own factories and leverage demand by clubbing it. Here Indian Railway’s decision to decentralise sleeper manufacturing is also crying for review.
• Need to ensure that engineering decisions taken by the Railway Board are based on technical merits and are not commercially driven.
• Need to ensure that the Railway Board takes into account the impact on the Indian economy of awarding long-term contracts, before committing to such deals.
• Need to make sure that broad consultation is done with experts, industry players and other stakeholders before any tendering process is initiated.
• Need to ensure that any such tender results in a truly fair and competitive bidding process.
• Need to ensure that any decisions made regarding tendering are in the best interest of the Indian Railways and the taxpayers of India.
Finally, paraphrasing a senior retired railway officer, who commented on the #Advisor-
To continue…
-Suresh Tripathi