RLDA Gorakhpur Land Tender Crisis

Post-Bid Documents, Yet Technical Clearance: Questions Over RLDA Gorakhpur Tender Decisions Deepen As Severe Bid Violations and Multi-Fold Experience Inflation Surface

#Railwhispers’ Investigation

New Delhi/Gorakhpur: The decision of the Rail Land Development Authority (#RLDA) to grant technical clearance to the consortium of HPGK Infra Pvt. Ltd. and Aisshpra Life Spaces Pvt. Ltd. and immediately proceed with opening its financial bid has triggered serious questions over the execution of competitive public procurement. However, a closer examination of the underlying #Tender records for the prestigious Asuran Chowk project reveals a much wider, systemic crisis of bidding compliance, involving an over eight-fold experience inflation attempt by another major contender, M/s Gallantt Lifespace Developers Pvt. Ltd. (Consortium).

The high-stakes tender, issued under RFP No. RLDA/RFP/CD-23 of 2026, involves the grant of a 99-year lease of 18,739.18 square metres of railway land near Asuran Chowk, Gorakhpur, along with the mandatory redevelopment of 50 railway quarters on a revenue-sharing model. While five active bidders successfully submitted technical proposals by the 22 April 2026 deadline, subsequent evaluation reviews have exposed fundamental deviations from the eligibility rules visible in the official tender guidelines.

Massive 8x Area Inflation Identified in Gallantt Consortium’s Original Pitch

Records indicate that the consortium led by M/s Gallantt Lifespace Developers Pvt. Ltd.—which includes AD Sons Reality Pvt. Ltd., Limelite Tradecom Pvt. Ltd., and Mr. Vikram Saraf—staked its primary technical eligibility on the “Khorabar Township and Medicity” project in Gorakhpur. In its original Bid Form 3B, the lead member claimed a massive built-up area of 757,765.87 square metres under a 25% completion milestone.

However, contemporary Gorakhpur Development Authority (#GDA) documentation reveals that the entire Khorabar project has a total sanctioned FSI of just 93,000 square metres. With the project sitting at approximately 25% completion, the actual constructed area ready for occupation stands at a maximum of 23,250 square metres. This indicates that the Gallantt consortium’s declared project area was artificially inflated by more than eight times the true legal figure, apparently to meet the minimum technical experience thresholds mandated by the RFP.

Unsubstantiated Claims and the Unprecedented ‘Post-Bid Disappearance’ of Core Projects

When specifically called upon to produce an Occupancy Certificate and reconcile these massive discrepancies during the clarification window on 11 May 2026, the Gallantt consortium failed to provide any supporting regulatory documentation. Instead of substantiating their submission, the bidder took the extraordinary step of entirely deleting the Khorabar project from a newly revised Bid Form 3B.

The consortium then attempted to substitute its entire technical experience basis post-opening by presenting a completely new set of projects drawn from the portfolios of its three other consortium members. This sudden withdrawal has severely compromised the integrity of the original technical experience claim, rendering the formal certifications previously stamped by their registered Architect, Ar. Yashvardhan Khetan, and Statutory Auditor, M/s APNG & Associates, wholly unreliable and raising calls for a formal reference to the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI).

Multi-Level Structural Disqualifications Ignored in Equity Layouts

Beyond the experience discrepancies, the Gallantt consortium committed a separate, un-curable structural breach of the tender’s core guidelines. Under Clause 7.4(A) of Part-III of the RFP, every individual member of a bidding consortium is strictly required to hold a minimum of 26% equity in the Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) to be incorporated for the project.

However, Gallantt’s formal equity distribution structure allocated a massive 70% share to the lead member, while leaving its three technical partners—AD Sons Reality Pvt. Ltd., Limelite Tradecom Pvt. Ltd., and Mr. Vikram Saraf—with a minor 10% equity stake each. This clear violation constitutes an independent, absolute ground for rejection, which was further compounded by the consortium’s failure to even declare its joint structure in its original Bid Form 1 cover letter.

The HPGK-Aisshpra Paper Trail: Post-Bid Evidence Used to Construct Substantive Eligibility

The details surrounding the technical qualification of the Consortium of M/s HPGK Infra Pvt. Ltd. & M/s Aisshpra Life Spaces Pvt. Ltd. are equally contentions. On the official bid due date of 22 April 2026, the HPGK-Aisshpra group submitted a Bid Form 3B that was completely non-compliant on its face: it was entirely unsigned and failed to state the built-up area in square metres as explicitly required under Clause 16 of the RFP. 
More critically, the primary evidence required to validate their entire technical existence—the GDA certificate proving a total project footprint of 1,13,905.63 square metres and the corresponding Architect’s certificate confirming Aisshpra’s 33.33% proportionate share (yielding an eligible BUA of 37,968.54 square metres)—did not form part of the original submission.

These core eligibility documents were introduced for the first time nineteen days late, on 11 May 2026, in response to a clarification request. While Clause 17.4 of the RFP allows bidders to elucidate existing documents, it strictly prohibits the post-facto introduction of fresh primary evidence to construct eligibility that was wholly unsubstantiated at the time of bid opening.

Total Absence of Verified Milestone Dates and Valid Partnership Deeds

Industry scrutiny has further highlighted that the HPGK-Aisshpra bid lacks a verified, independent project completion date for its sole benchmark project, “Palm Paradise”. Without an explicit date on record, it remains legally impossible to verify whether the project satisfies the mandatory requirement of completion within the preceding ten financial years mandated by Clause 6 of Part-III. Furthermore, no registered partnership deed, joint development agreement, or ownership document accompanied the original bid package to independently corroborate the claimed 33.33% corporate share, meaning the authority accepted the group’s eligibility baseline solely on the strength of post-opening submissions.

Severe Prejudice to Compliant Bidders and Demands for EMD Forfeiture

The decision to overlook these substantive deficiencies has sparked widespread debate within real estate and infrastructure procurement circles regarding competitive fairness. Records show that three separate external entities—M/s Sunil Shukla, M/s Shobhik Goyyal & Ashok Kumar Goyal, and M/s Omni Farms Pvt. Ltd.—registered and paid their non-refundable Bid Document Fees and Earnest Money Deposits (EMD) but refrained from submitting technical bids by the strict deadline, presumably because they could not assemble fully compliant paperwork in time.

Allowing lagging consortia to completely overhaul, reconstruct, and introduce primary eligibility evidence weeks after the bids are unsealed creates an uneven playing field. Consequently, established procurement protocols dictate the absolute, outright rejection of both the Gallantt Lifespace Developers Consortium and the HPGK-Aisshpra Life Spaces Consortium.

Furthermore, due to the severe misrepresentations identified in the Gallantt submission, the authority is under pressure to initiate formal legal proceedings to execute a total forfeiture of their EMD/Bid Security, while immediately proceeding with the opening of the compliant financial bids submitted by the remaining three transparent contenders: Jai Mata Dee and Maa Sita Construction, Oasis Realtech Pvt. Ltd. (Consortium), and Mr. Shobhik Goyyal.

#SunilShukla #ShobhikGoyyal #AshokKumarGoyal #OmniFarms #GallanttLifespaceDevelopers #HPGKAisshpraLifeSpaces #Consortium #JaiMataDee #MaaSitaConstruction #OasisRealtech #HPGKInfra #AisshpraLifeSpaces #ADSonsReality #LimeliteTradecom #VikramSaraf