Kashmir Rail Link Project: Railway Board’s circus at Chenab Bridge!

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Railway Board’s circus scales new heights as the Country pays the price for the scuttling of the review of alignment in 2009

By: Alok Kumar Verma, Retd IRSE

Date – 3rd March 2021: Besides the mega bridges at Anji and Chenab, the alignment at any of the following six locations could indefinitely delay completion of construction of the Kashmir Rail Link, possibly taking it to 2030 and beyond – No matter how many compromises are made with increase in cost, reduction in line capacity and further impairment of stability, safety & survivability of the line:

  1. Bridge No. 60 and cutting for Basindadhar station and the nearby Tunnel No. 14.

  2. Bridge No. 2 and 3 and the cutting etc for Sumber station.

  3. Cuttings for the Sangaldan station, the Tunnels 42 to 47 and Bridge No. 85 and 87
  4. Cuttings for Arpinchala station.
  5. Bridge No. 41,42,and 43 and the cuttings for Salal station.
  6. Bridge No. 38 and 39 and the cutting for Reasi station.

The existing alignment in each of the above stretches is a direct result of the April-August 2009 scuttling of the review of alignment, which review Board had ordered in 2008 after I have submitted my study of the unworkability of the existing slope-skirting type of 1 in 100 ruling gradient alignment and proposed adoption of the new methodology of a straighter and shorter alignment with 1 in 40 ruling gradient which I had developed on my own initiative in 2005-08.

The facts show that since 2009 when the review of alignment of the Katra-Banihal Rail Link was scuttled, Railway Board has been claiming the project is in good health and construction would be completed soon.

But facts make it crystal clear that the project has actually been continuously in an ICU. Facts show that it must have been obvious to anyone conversant with the situation on the project, the problems being faced because of the adverse terrain and geology on the realigned alignment that the promised targets were beyond the realm of possibilities.

I will deal with each location (with current status) in detail with relevant extracts from the reports, my presentations and references to my earlier posts on this issue of alignment.

All location in terms of kilometerages are with respect to the original alignment.

The current alignment at each of the above locations has the common factor discussed in the next para.

The Ravindra Committee examined the realignment plan prepared by the international consultant had prepared with ruling gradient 1 in 60, and the Committee suggested changes. But two Railway Board Members (who were in September 2010 held to account by Delhi High Court for scuttling of the alignment review) arbitrarily reduced the ruling gradient to 1 in 80 which made it impossible for the consultant to bring about the improvements suggested by the committee.

The result was that the Committee’s recommendations were simply ignored.

In the alternative alignment which I proposed location of each of these stations is changed with the alignment cutting across the geological fault lines favourably at close to 90 degrees. You can see this clearly in the attached map of the alignments juxtaposed on Google Earth satellite image.

BASINDADHAR STN AND TUNNEL 14:

This station will be built on a 232 m long bridge on a particularly unfavourable deep khad, and will be party in Tunnel 13/14 and cuttings. The alignment in this stretch runs along major geological fault lines and the rocks are intensely crushed and folded.

I highlighted these features in my Presentation to the Ravindra Committee and later in 2014-15 to the Sreedharan Committee also.

Although the Consultant submitted it’s final report in March’ 2010, Northern Railway (NR) failed to finalise the alignment and the layout of the bridge (General Arrangement Drawing or GAD) for nine years till end of 2019. Construction of the bridge began few months back.

Considering the extremely adverse geological conditions and the size of bridge, cuttings etc. construction in this stretch could take 6 to 10 more years.

BRIDGE NO. 2 AND 3 AND THE CUTTING FOR SUMBER STATION

The GAD was approved by NR in 2017, more than 7 years after the Consultant submitted it’s report on realignment. This is geologically one of the worst stretches of the current alignment.

The bridges are situated on a thick deposit of slope debris (Depth up to 69 m as per report of geotechnical investigation done in 2018-19) near the Panjal Thrust.

Between these two bridges there will be a 40 to 60 m high cutting in slope debris (Talus Slope, also called slope composed of Colluvium or Scree).

A massive landslide occurred in November 2017 while the slope was being excavated to build the cutting. The landslide continued slowly till mid-2019.

A foreign consultant was engaged to suggest a slope stabilization plan. I don’t have details of the plan, but I am sure that slope stabilization is not a survivable solution.

The alignment in this stretch should be changed to relocate the bridge away from the slope debris. Construction in this stretch also could take 6 to 10 more years

I. CUTTINGS FOR THE SANGALDAN STATON, THE TUNNELS 42 TO 47 AND BRIDGE NO. 85 & 87

II. CUTTINGS FOR ARPINCHALA STATION

I dealt with these two stretches in detail explaining these as examples of extreme skirting with tunnels at shallow depth and high cuttings in extremely landslide-prone stretches, with both the Sangaldan and Arpinchala stations on deep deposits of slope debris.

The Ravindra Committee had said in its report that the realignment plan prepared by Amberg with 1 in 60 ruling gradient is not satisfa tory and should be refined to better deal with the Murree Thrust along which the alignment runs in the entire stretch from Km 90 to Km 101 (Page 21).

Similarly, it said that the realignment plan for Arpinchala station should also be changed (Page 22).

But, for both these stretches, the original alignment was retained by Railway Board, claiming as sufficient justification that contracts have been awarded for these stretches and expenditure incurred.

Two major landslides have taken place in this stretch at Sangaldan while construction was in progress, the first in 2006 between Tunnels 42 and 43 and the next in 2011 at the north portal of Tunnel 47.

Portions of partly built cuttings / embankments and tunnels collapsed.

The status now at Sangaldan and Arpinchala is as follows:

SANGALDAN: The cutting at Sangaldan station location began to fail in 2010. Since 2013, there is no construction to stabilize the cutting or change alignment.

Attention is on carrying out repairs to prevent further sliding down of the slope, which could be a threat to the houses of the local residents of the town.

Work at Bridge No. 85 and 87 is going on in fits and starts.

It seems KRCL, who is incharge of construction in this stretch, hasn’t yet been able to come up with a stabilization plan for the Sangaldan cutting and the adjoining tunnels.

ARPINCHALA: At Arpinchala massive slope stabilization work with huge retaining walls is being carried out for past many years.

In my view alignment in both the above stretches is in-constructable, and if construction is carried out it may not even last till the mandatory inspection by the Commissioner of Railway Safety.

This is not new to Indian Railway, but the failures on this line are likely to have more severe consequences than what these have been on the Lumding-Silchar line, considering the various adverse factors on the Kashmir line, like higher elevations up the slopes, the greater height and size of bridges and cuttings, and the extremely curved tunnels.

THE EXAMPLE OF THE NEWLY CONVERTED LAMDING-SILCHAR LINE (NFR) FROM MG TO BG IN 2015-17:

The most important example is of the Lumding-Silchar line, Northeast Frontier Railway (which was converted from MG to BG in 2003-15) for which the CRS asked me (I was then Chief Bridge Engineer/NFR) in May – June 2015 to give him my assessment of stability of the newly constructed line.

Based on my report and an extensive examination of the past reports of landslides during construction by the CRS himself, the CRS declined to give clearance for running of passenger trains on safety concerns.

When NFR opened the line without carrying out an in-depth study of the slope stability on the line and heavy monsoon rains began early that year, I closed the line.

But, GM/NFR ordered opening of the line.

Soon landslides caused two derailments involving the prestigious Sampark Kranti Express, and within a week thereafter a series of landslides led to a record closure of the line for about two months.

Even today, despite expenditure of more than INR 500 crore on emergency slope stabilization works and other measures to keep the line open, this line is beset by landslides and other forms of ground failure which are taking a heavy toll of train operations with drastically reduced line capacity.

You can read about these developments in the article which appeared in Governance Now in the link given towards the end of this post.

BRIDGE NO. 41,42, AND 43 AND THE CUTTINGS FOR SALAL STATION:

When Sreedharan Committee met in Dec’14, design of Bridge No. 43 was still being carried out. In my Presentation to the Committee, I highlighted the multiple adverse geological features at the site of this huge bridge, including the fact that the bridge is to be built on a Talus Slope of unconsolidated slope debris that is 30 to 50 m deep.

In my view this stretch is among the worst seven stretches of this alignment. The others being Sangaldan, Sumber, Reasi, Basindadhar stations, the Anji Bridge and the Chenab Bridge.

If construction is carried out at Bridge No. 43, it may not even last till the mandatory inspection by the Commissioner of Railway Safety. This is not totally new to Indian Railway as I have mentioned above.

BRIDGE NO. 38 & 39, AND THE CUTTINGS FOR REASI STATION:

Bridge No. 39 is a massive bridge of length 490 m and height 94 m above the floor of the khad, close to me Reasi Thrust which is also called the Main Boundary Thrust of the Himalayas. Bridge No. 38 is also large.

These bridges will carry Reasi Station. I dealt with the adverse terrain and geology of this stretch at this station.

The Ravindra Committee said in its report that construction in the stretch from Km 30 to 42 which is just short of Reasi Station and these bridges should be held in abeyance till in-depth examination of feasibility of the mega arch bridge is carried out (Page 57).

But, construction was restarted within a year. After four years of resumption of work in this stretch (2010 to 2014), Railway Board conceded that construction of the mega arch bridge was not feasible. A fresh survey was carried out to find an alternative location for crossing Anji Khad.

Unconfirmed reports say that the survey showed that the alignment may have to be changed beyond Km 42 to include Bridge Nos. 38 & 39 also and relocation of the Reasi Station.

But after several flip flops, Railway Board decided in late 2016 that a cable-stayed bridge should be built at the same site where the mega arch bridge was planned to be constructed.

The question arises:

“Was this decision taken to avoid responsibility for going against the recommendation of the Ravindra Committee by restarting construction in Km 30 to 42 and the Bridge Nos. 38 and 39 without in-depth examination of the arch bridge at Anji and finding an alternative site for a smaller bridge at a more favourable location?”

When Sreedharan Committee met in Dec’14, design of Bridge No. 38 & 39 was still being carried out.

The status now is that construction of the superstructure (composite deck) of this giant bridge has just begun.

Despite detailed findings of facts by Delhi High Court (preceded by an equally exhaustive order by the Principal Bench of the Central Administrative Tribunal) that the review of alignment was scuttled and identification of the persons mainly responsible for this, no action was taken against these top officials of Railway Board.

This judgment was upheld by the Supreme Court which dismissed Railway Board’s SLP.

Then came reports by the CAG of India and the Parliamentary Accounts Committee (PAC). The PAC said that responsibility should be fixed for the lapses that led to drastic changes in the alignment [despite the scuttling] that resulted in loss of more than INR 3,000 crore.

But Railway Board did not act on this recommendation as no one was held to accountable.

Then in 2014, another bench of Delhi HC ordered that because in 2008-09 the Ravindra Committee had failed to do so, another Expert Committee be set up to examine the relative merits and demerits of the Railway Board’s approved alignment methodology and the methodology suggested by me.

The Sreedharan Committee which was constituted by Railway Board in response to this order, unanimously said that the alignment should be changed and the alignment proposed by me on the methodology developed by me should be adopted.

Railway Board arbitrarily rejected the report of the Committee claiming it knew best what should be done, confidently stating on affidavits that construction was progressing satisfactorily and construction of a stable, safe and secure line on the existing alignment will be completed be end of 2018.

But, the situation today is that less than 50% of the construction has been done. It is also becoming clear that the Sreedharan Committee was right in its assessment back in 2015 that by no stretch of imagination can this line be constructed by the end of 2022.

The Committee also said cost will increase astronomically. This is also coming true.

It is becoming clear that while this is going to be the costliest mountain railway so far in the world, its line capacity will be less than half of a normal single line in mountains because of the compromises made by Railway Board to somehow construct the line –

“Reduction in the number of loops from two to one at all intermediate stations except one station, reduction in the length of the loops and passenger platforms, increased spacing of stations, long serpentine alignment, and safety risks because of highly curved tunnels etc.”

My aim in writing this detailed article is to provide a comprehensive account of this project of National Importance based on my involvement with not just this project but also the other six projects in the Himalayas which are also suffering badly on account of a flawed alignment methodology that has failed to address the challenges posed by the terrain and geology of the young Himalayas on each of these projects.

I have relied on verifiable facts and an objective detailed assessment of the present conditions of construction on the most critical stretched of the alignment. If anybody finds that any fact is untrue or some important fact has been ignored, please feel free to point them out to me.

Before closing, I would like to point out that faced with a most daunting situation on the Leh line, Railway Board finally approved in 2017 an alignment for Final Location Survey that is actually based on my methodology.

This alignment has all the features of my alignment methodology which Rilway Board was vehemently opposing till then:

  1. Steep ruling gradient of 1 in 40,
  2. Tunnels laid deep into the mountains,
  3. Small bridges
  4. Straighter alignment not more than 20 to 40% longer than the straight line distance etc.

Northern Railway officers came to me in September last year to discuss their alignment with me and sought my suggestions. What more is needed for this alignment, I have told Northern Railway through my email:

  1. proper geological survey,
  2. steeper grade if 1 in 35 and also
  3. to seriously consider Meter Gauge because of difficulties of constructing a BG line at altitudes of 3000-5000 m.

I hope that the present Railway Board and the Government of India will take a thorough view of the status of all these seven projects in Himalayas so that necessary corrective actions can be taken immediately to limit the loss to the country, and stable, safe and survivable lines for reliable all-weather transportation can be built in the Himalayas.

This will also ensure that for all future projects where construction is yet to start – Bilaspur-Manali-Leh, Chardham Railway etc. – workable alignments shall be adopted.

Thanks for your patience with this long post.

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