Kathua Incident: A joint memorandum submitted to all DRMs/GMs by AISMA-AILRSA against misuse of rule 14(ii)

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There was a protest in all Divisions of #IndianRailways on Tuesday, 05.03.2024 by All India Station MastersтАЩ Association (#AISMA) against removal of 4 employees under #Rule 14(ii) of Discipline & Appeal Rules, 1968 in the incident of roll down of a #Load from #Kathua station in #Firozpur Division of #NorthernRailway. A joint memorandum submitted by the #AISMA and #AILRSA to all the DRMs and GMs of Zonal Railways.

KATHUA ACCIDENT – POST MORTEM

  1. Total 53 waggons without #BV & #BPC were allowed for ballast loading.
  2. Train order was given for the #ballast train, well knowing that the train doesn’t have BPC & BV, without arranging a #TMR.
  3. The formation which was stabled in a siding with isolation was shunted to the main line, which doesn’t have isolation, without the supervision of the TMR, while there was a single #points-man on duty.
  4. A multiple unit engine and a crew were wasted for 10 hours for this futile exercise to run the material train, violating all #Safety-rules of working a material train.
  5. To wreck the vengeance on the #Locopilot who resisted the blatant #violation of safety rules, he was ordered to go as #pilot to an out station running room 120 kms away, while his headquarters station is just 20 kms away.
  6. That #vindictive decision of pilot movement could be taken by the #control, just 10 minutes before the arrival of the train in the direction of the running room.
  7. Loco Pilot was asked to shut down the #loco and stable it within 5 minutes, the train arrived in 8 minutes, #LP reached the #SM office in 9 minutes & handed over the keys, the train was detained for 5 minutes for the #crew to board.
  8. The LP was forced to do so by the #controller because there was no following train to the outstation, but available to his headquarters.
  9. #NorthernRailway is one which even today forces the crew to run trains on main line without connecting the BP pipes.
  10. There are special instructions prohibiting use of formation brake for shunting. GS/AISMA #PadamSingh itself was booked off duty for refusing to shunt a full formation of loaded #petroleum tanker train without attatching the BP pipe.

When safety rules do not have the value of paper on which it is printed, who is responsible for the Kathua accident of roll down?

Yes, crew is at fault, he could have remembered that the train pipe was connected to formation, the rarest thing happen there during #shunting and applied the A9 to emergency.

Yes, the station staff could have secured the formation with #handbrake and #chain, that they never do when the control says crew is on the way.

There were no wilful violation of rules by the workers, omissions are out of circumstantial pressure.

There many who ordered wilful violations of rules, where are they after the accident?

  1. Who permitted to load material train without Van & BPC?
  2. Who permitted to order a material train without #Guard, #BrakeVan & #BPC?
  3. Who ordered shunting of a material train without the supervision of TMR?
  4. Who ordered shutting down of loco and stabling on main line?
  5. Who allowed to wreck vengeance against the crew and sent them to a running room 120 kms away, instead of to their headquarters 20 kms away only, that too forcing them to shutdown the loco and secure it within 8 minutes, threatening them on the consequences of delaying a passenger train?
  6. Who is responsible for the posting a single points man where a full rake shunting is being done?
  7. Who gave the #DEE & #DOM powers to misuse 14(ii) of D&A Rules?

The running staff should have to retaliate with refusing to violate safety rules daily joining hands with other departments too, that is the only way before the staff, when officers turn demons.