Southern Railway Confirms that this is Balasore Type Accident
Indian Railways can no longer afford to carry dead wood and toxic officers
If officers know that they will lose their jobs, they will stand-up and refuse short-cuts
In a system when enquiry report of CRS is kept confidential, system does not learn lessons and message conveys that eveything is manageable for the privileged few of #AIDS and #KMG
In an interview from the accident site, what the Head of #SouthernRailway has confirmed makes it clear that the mode of #accident at #Kavaraipettai on Friday, 11 October is like what happened in Balasore-signal lamp and point set were inconsistent. As reported TNIE, “TN train crash: Experts say ‘Balasore repeated’ as data-logger reveals train changed tracks before collision”. This has now been reported by several news channels and newspapers like ET- “Balasore repeated as data logger video shows train changed track before collision in Tamil Nadu-experts”.
Please see the accident site: Courtesy – #PolimerNews –
Many serious questions arise
On 03.04.2023, #MemberInfrastructure, #RailwayBoard, wrote a letter to all the Zonal General Managers pointing out as many as five cases in just a span of three months where #point and #signal-lamp were inconsistent, i.e. #signal was for one line while point was set to another line.
Few weeks later, same mode of #failure led to devastating #collision of #Coromandel Express with stabled goods train. The then Member Operation & Business Development (#MOBD), Railway Board, #SmtJayaVarmaSinha explained how the accident happened to the Hon’ble PM & HM, and other dignitaries at #PMO. Many say this incident led to #government granting her 11 months of extension to top-up one month of balance service to make her the Chairman & CEO of the Railway Board, perhaps to give her opportunity to eliminate this mode of failure. Smt. Jaya Varma Sinha spent her 12 months asking for setting right all wiring and updation of Station Working Rules (#SWR).
It appears, #SouthernRailway failed in this prima-facie. How can message go? Like in good old days, #responsibility needs to be fixed. Letter of Shri #RNSunkar, who was the Member Infrastructure was marked to the #DGSafety. #GM, #PCSO and #DRM bear direct responsibility to ensure that circuits are in good shape, no short-cuts in day-today maintenance practices. However, real reasons will emerge with #CRS enquiry, few things are clear as pointed in The New Indian Express report.
LHB design saved passengers and this is to the credit of #Modi-government to have embarked on replacement of #ICF coaches by #LHB despite the fact that LHB coaches were introduced during #Bajpai government in 2000 after then delay of almost ten years. Thousands have been victims when #signalling or #track errors combined with the dated design of ICF coaches.
An expert in #TNIE report, suspects that perhaps the #Train followed two routes which led to the accident. However, prima-facie it does not appear to be so. #Locomotive clearly was led to the occupied line where it hit the #guard-van and crushed it, clearly the path train saw was to the occupied track. This thankfully saved the #crew of the locomotive as energy was dissipated as observed by Shri #Shubhranshu, in TNIE dispatch – “LHB coaches features contributed to zero casualties in Kavaraipettai railway accident”. Rest of the coaches jack knifed as seen in drone footage – which is tell-tale sign of train entering sharp curve (a loop line entry is a sharp curve).
While investigating similar accident of New Farakka Express at Harchandpur near #Raebareli, CRS observed that, “During my inspection of Doubling in #NFRailway on 22.10.2018 along with #CSTE/Const. and #CAO/Const./I/NFR, it was demonstrated by S&T officials at #Tangani station that by doing manipulation in #location-box wiring, it is possible to get Normal Indication of #Point on #Panel whereas point at site is actually in Reverse”.
Report also observes that, “Wiring of recording relay room opening by data-logger was found disconnected. There was no recording of #Relay-Room Door Opening by #DataLogger for quite a long time”.
Railway officials know this since ages. This is what Member Infrastructure reiterated in his letter few weeks before Balasore accident.
Is this pardonable? Why cannot #DRMs and #PCSO ensure such basic aspects?
What needs to be done
Unless action is taken, #system becomes smug. If officers know that they will lose their jobs, they will stand up and refuse short cuts. #Managerial responsibility has been a big #casualty of past ten years as Khan Market Gang (#KMG) and All India Delhi Service (#AIDS) have blunted #political will to reform railways. #CRS can give proximate or direct reasons. It is duty of #CRB and #GM to draw conclusions and improve managerial systems and processes. But does that happen? Sadly no. In a system when #enquiry report of CRS is kept #confidential, system does not learn lessons and message conveys that eveything is manageable for the privileged few of #AIDS and #KMG.
#IndianRailways can no longer afford to carry dead wood and toxic officers, as Hon’ble PM said on 11 October –
FR 56(J) is the only remedy for proven #corrupt from Indian Railways, #manipulators from #Vigilance – the trimurti which is even now protected – and engineering officers who have spent their career in doing what they were not recruited for. Sense of entitlement has to be summarily shaken off.
It needs to be reiterated that #Kavach has very limited applicability – it cannot act in side collisions and track failures. Also, when there are #wiring or #circuit errors, then also Kavach is largely disabled. It appears that just by keeping good old #interlocking in good fettle following basic tenets of fail-safe principle, Kavach’s basic purpose can be achieved. Kavach will be big disrupter as it is asset heavy – all stations, every relay room, many of the location boxes, all locomotives will need addition of complex embedded systems. Further, practically entire length of #IndianRailways will need an additional #telecom network – its O&M will shift in hands of private hands.
We do not have a #MInfra. It needs to be immediately ascertained if the #ESM, #JEs, #SSE, #ASTE, #DSTE and #SrDSTE understand wiring and can troubleshoot. The training of these officials needs to be reviewed.
Need to Make CRS Enquiry Report Public
This is common sight in #RelayRooms as noted by the #CRS in accident for #Balasore type of reason at #Harchandpur in 2018 near Raebareli (New Farakka Express), can’t GM or DRMs see these loose hanging wires. After Balasore a drive was started to have double locks on Relay Rooms. Surprisingly this left location boxes which as, observed by the CRS – in his report on accident of #NewFarakkaExpress – the location boxes are also points of vulnerability. How many locks can be provided? This cannot be the solution.
Since these observations remained buried in confidential CRS reports, these lessons were not implemented and led to the accidents noted by #MInfra (quoted above) and Balasore which happened few weeks later. It is time that CRS reports are made available to all railway officials.
This is an aspect that needs to be examined by #engineers outside of S&T department. Designs also need to be hardened which does not permit short-cuts, i.e. whenever any looping or wiring is changed from what was commissioned and certified, signals must turn red in entire jurisdiction.
It is time that Data Loggers are taken out of the control of S&T department. Similarly, the recording equipment of locomotives like #speed-recorders, #black-boxes, remote monitoring units (#RMUs) should be of different make than the make of #propulsion. Even in case of Kavach, in case they get installed, the Kavach should not be of the #company which has supplied locomotive propulsion. This will increase #Safety by several orders of magnitude.